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Available online 13 May 2014A well-replicated finding in the psychological literature is the negative correlation between
religiosity and intelligence. However, several studies also conclude that one form of religiosity,
church attendance, is protective against later-life cognitive decline. No effects of religious
belief per se on cognitive decline have been found, potentially due to the restricted measures of
belief used in previous studies. Here, we examined the associations between religiosity,
intelligence, and cognitive change in a cohort of individuals (initial n = 550) with high-
quality measures of religious belief taken at age 83 and multiple cognitive measures taken in
childhood and at four waves between age 79 and 90. We found that religious belief, but not
attendance, was negatively related to intelligence. The effect size was smaller than in previous
studies of younger participants. Longitudinal analyses showed no effect of either religious
belief or attendance on cognitive change either from childhood to old age, or across the ninth
decade of life. We discuss differences between our cohort and those in previous studies –
including in age and location – that may have led to our non-replication of the association
between religious attendance and cognitive decline.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Keywords:
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Inc. This is an open access arbelief, has been consistently negatively associatedwith cognitive
ability (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). That is, individuals
who are more religious tend to have lower intelligence, albeit by
only a small degree. However, some studies indicate that, in later
life, religiosity is protective against age-related cognitive decline
(e.g. Van Ness & Kasl, 2003). In the present study, we investigate
this apparent paradox in a sample of older individuals who
completed detailed measures of religiosity at age 83 years, and
for whom cognitive ability data were available from childhood
and from multiple tests between ages 79 and 90.
Evidence for the negative relation of religiosity to
cognitive ability comes from a variety of studies, recently
meta-analyzed by Zuckerman et al. (2013). Over 85% of the 63
studies included in the analysis showed a negative correlation
between the two measures, and the overall random-effects
meta-analytic correlation between religiosity and intelligence
was r = − .24. Zuckerman et al. (2013) discussed a number of
possible explanations for this correlation, ranging from the lowerticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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to the possibility that religion acts to support attributes that
higher intelligencemay itself confer on other individuals, such as
self-enhancement and self-control. Importantly for the present
study, the majority (73%) of the studies in the meta-analysis
examined religiosity and intelligence in university students or
even younger samples, and only two studies – Blanchard-Fields,
Hertzog, Stein, and Pak (2001), who studied a sample ranging
from 23 to 86 years, and McCullough, Enders, Brion, and Jain
(2005), who used longitudinal data following a sample aged 24–
40 in 1940 across over 50 years – included some individualswho
were in later life. To date, no studies have examined the
correlation between religion and intelligence in individuals
over 80 years of age. Since late life is a time atwhich individuals
may engage in greater reflection on the past, with concomitant
increases in religiosity (Hunsberger, 1985), it is of particular
interest to test whether the association between intelligence
and religiosity tends to be of a different size (or direction) in
later life compared to earlier ages.
A smaller literature exists testing the relation of religion
to later-life cognitive change. In one sample of 2812 older
individuals aged 65 years and above (Van Ness & Kasl,
2003), higher religious attendance, but not stronger religious
identity, was associated with lower rates of cognitive im-
pairment 3 years later (but not by 6 years later) as measured
on the Short Portable Mental Status Questionnaire (SPMSQ;
Pfeiffer, 1975). A subsequent study (Hill, Burdette, Angel,
& Angel, 2006) found a similar result in 3050 Mexican–
Americans: those who attended church more regularly had
shallower declines in cognitive function as measured by the
Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein,
& McHugh, 1975) than those who were less frequent or
non-attendees (see also Reyes-Ortiz et al., 2008, for a further
analysis of the same dataset including an extra wave of
cognitive testing, extending the study to 11 years, with the
same conclusions). Yeager et al. (2006), in a sample of 4440
Taiwanese individuals, found effects of religious attendance
(but, again, not belief) on cognitive decline measured by
three cognitive tests, such that individuals with more regular
attendance had better cognition after 4 years of follow-up.
Finally, Corsentino, Collins, Sachs-Ericsson, and Blazer (2009)
analyzed a sample of 2938 American women aged 65
and over across a three-year follow-up period, finding that
religious attendance was associated with less cognitive decline,
also measured using the SPMSQ.
The effect of religious attendance, but not belief, found in
these studies is usually interpreted as indicating that social
engagement, regardless of its type, is beneficial in cognitive
aging (see e.g. Zunzunegui, Alvarado, Del Ser, & Otero, 2003);
the beliefs per se, therefore, might be unimportant. For
instance, Yeager et al. (2006) saw the relation of attendance
to cognitive decline disappear in the presence of controls
for social engagement. However, some studies have found
effects of religious attendance even after controlling for social
support (e.g. Corsentino et al., 2009), suggesting that specific
aspects of religious activity are protective against cognitive
decline. It is perhaps difficult, then, to reconcile these findings
with the research that shows a relatively unambiguous
negative correlation of religiosity with cognitive ability,
discussed above, unless the intelligence–religion relationship
is substantially different in old age.The previous research on cognitive decline and religiosity
has some limitations that may explain this apparent contra-
diction. First, all the studies, aside from that of Yeager
et al. (2006), use cognitive function measures such as the
MMSE and the SPMSQ that are designed to detect cognitive
pathology. Such measures are useful for screening older
individuals for dementia, but do not necessarily provide an
accurate estimate of their general intelligence. In addition,
these tests have reasonably pronounced ceiling effects, and
thus tend to have poor sensitivity to milder cognitive decline,
or cognitive decline in healthier or more highly educated
samples (e.g. Pendlebury, Cuthbertson, Welch, Mehta, &
Rothwell, 2010). Second, the studies that were able to assess
religious belief in addition to attendance tend to have done
so using very short, simple measures that may not have been
sensitive enough to detect associations with change in
cognition. It is still an open question, then, whether and
how a more detailed measure of religious belief – tapping
more dimensions of belief, and obtaining a better spread of
scores than a one-item measure – would be associated with
cognitive decline. Third, the follow-up periods of all the
studies except Reyes-Ortiz et al. (2008) are less than
10 years. Fourth, all samples included a wide age range.
Here, we sought to overcome these limitations by
analyzing a narrow-age cohort with multiple, detailed
measures of religious belief and multiple, sensitive cognitive
tests taken four times across an eleven-year period that
covered the entire ninth decade of life. The cohort is also
situated in the United Kingdom, a country with generally low
religiosity (Norris & Inglehart, 2004), where no previous
studies of religiosity and cognitive decline have been
reported. It was therefore of interest to test whether the
findings from previous studies held in a society in which
relatively less importance is attached to religious attendance,
and where older individuals may receive social support from
other, non-religious social groups.1.1. The present study
In line with the previous literature, we hypothesized that
religiosity, measured in this study by religious belief and
church attendance, would be significantly negatively corre-
lated with intelligence. We then tested three hypotheses
regarding religiosity's association with cognitive change. A
rare aspect of our sample – the participants' completion of a
test of cognitive ability in childhood as well as in old age –
allowed us to test the hypothesis that religiosity would be
associated with cognitive change across the life course
(from age 11 to age 79). To our knowledge, no previous
papers have tested this hypothesis. We also tested the
hypothesis that longitudinal cognitive change would be
associated with change in religiosity (in this sample,
measured by religious attendance only). Finally, we tested
the hypothesis that religiosity would be associated with
cognitive change within the ninth decade of life. Based on
the literature discussed above, the prediction was made that
only religious attendance, and not religious belief, would
associate with the slope of later-life cognitive change such
that more regular attendance would be associated with
shallower decline.
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2.1. Participants
Participants were members of the Lothian Birth Cohort
1921 (Deary, Gow, Pattie, & Starr, 2012; Deary, Whiteman,
Starr, Whalley, & Fox, 2004), a longitudinal study of aging,
especially cognition. Most of these individuals had completed
a test of cognitive ability as part of the Scottish Mental Survey
1932 (Scottish Council for Research in Education, 1933), and
were contacted for follow-up testing between 1999 and 2001,
when they were aged an average of 79.1 years (SD = .6).
At the first wave of testing in older age, 550 individuals (316
female) attended a clinical research facility at the Wellcome
Trust Clinical Research Facility for assessments. The cohort has
been followed up in three subsequent waves, in 2003–2005
(mean age = 83.4 years, SD = .5; n = 321), 2007–2008
(mean age = 86.6 years, SD = .4, n = 237) and 2011–2012
(mean age = 90.1 years, SD = .1; n = 129; Deary et al.,
2012). In terms of religion, all participants were either
Christian or non-religious.
Each participant was screened for possible dementia
with the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975); we excluded nine
participants whose scores were below 24, a commonly-used
cutoff for possible cognitive impairment, at age 79. Thus, the
present study includes only those individuals with cognitive
ability in the range often considered “healthy” at baseline.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Cognitive ability
In 1932, the participants completed the Moray House Test
(MHT) No. 12, a verbal reasoning-focused measure of
cognitive ability that has been validated in childhood against
the Stanford Revision of the Binet Test. For full details, see
Deary et al. (2004).
At each of the four follow-up waves, cognitive ability was
assessed using three tests: Raven's Standard Progressive
Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1977), phonemic verbal
fluency (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004), and logical memory
from the Wechsler Memory Scale—Revised (Wechsler, 1987).
For the analyses described below, a general, maximum-
likelihood factor of cognitive ability (g) was extracted from
these tests using Bartlett's method for scores. The percentage
variance explained by this general factor was 31% at age 79,
35% at age 83, 38% at age 87, and 37% at age 90.
Participants were also administered the National Adult
Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991). Note that the
NARTwas not included as an indicator of the general factor since
it is used to estimate cognitive ability prior to any later-life
decline (McGurn et al., 2004); it was thus not appropriate for
inclusion in our analyses of current cognitive functioning in older
age, using tests that are sensitive to cognitive decline.
2.2.2. Religiosity
At wave 1 (age 79), the participants completed an
activity questionnaire, one item of which assessed how
often they attended church, on the following four-point
scale: 0, never; 1, rarely; 2, sometimes; 3, frequently. A
similar measure using a different scale was administered to
participants as part of a booklet-based survey mailed toparticipants (see Gow, Watson, Whiteman, & Deary, 2011,
for details of this survey, which was returned by 444
participants). The question read: “how often do you usually
attend religious ceremonies?” This was answered on a
six-point scale (never/once a year or less/several times a
year/once or more each month/once a week/more than
once a week) that, for the purposes of the present study,
was recoded to the same categories as the scale from
wave 1: “never” remained “never”; “once a year or less”
was recoded to “rarely”; “once or more each month” and
“once a week” were recoded to “sometimes”; and “once a
week” and “more than once a week” were recoded to
“frequently.”
The age-83 booklet contained two detailed questionnaires
assessing religious belief. The Religious Involvement Inven-
tory (RII; Hilty & Morgan, 1985) assesses the influence of
religion in an individual's life. Participants responded to each
of 33 items on a 4-point scale. For the 10 items that were
phrased in terms of frequencies (e.g. “how often do you read
the Bible?”), this scale ranged from “never” to “regularly,”
and for the 23 items that were statements of belief (e.g.
“I know that God answers my prayers”) this scale ranged
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” The RII is
intended to include two subscales, “Orthodoxy” (19 items)
and “Personal Faith” (14 items). However, the total scores
from these two subscales correlated very highly (r(340) =
.86, p b .001), and the Cronbach's α across all the items was
.98 (see also Gow et al., 2011, for evidence that the two
factors are not distinct). We thus chose to extract, using the
same procedure as that for the cognitive tests described
above, a single, unrotated factor (“general religious involve-
ment”) from the inventory. This factor explained 60.9% of the
variance across the items.
The Spiritual Wellbeing Scale (SWBS; Paloutzian & Ellison,
1982) measures two factors, “religious wellbeing” and “exis-
tential wellbeing,” each with 10 items. For the present study,
we used only the “religious wellbeing” items, since the
“existential” items contain no questions regarding religiosity.
Two example items from the “religious wellbeing” scale are
“I have a personally meaningful relationship with God” and
“I believe that God loves me and cares about me.” All items
were answered on a 6-point scale, from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree,” and the Cronbach's α of the scale was .95. A
single factor extracted from the “religious wellbeing” items
explained 65.00% of their variance, and this was used in the
calculations described below.
2.2.3. Covariates
Analyses included covariates of education and socioeco-
nomic status (SES). At interview at wave 1, participants
indicated their number of years of formal, full-time educa-
tion. They were asked about highest status job they had
before retiring, which was placed on a social class scale from
class V (unskilled) to I (professional), according to the 1951
Classification of Occupations from the General Register Office
Census (General Register Office, 1956).
2.3. Statistical analysis
We first tested the bivariate correlations among the cog-
nitive, religiosity, and demographic variables. Power analysis
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had 99% power to detect effect sizes similar to that found in the
Zuckerman et al. (2013) meta-analysis (r = (−).24), and 80%
power to detect effects of r = (−).15. Where measures only
from age 79were used, our sample sizes were somewhat larger.
Before their inclusion in any of the models, the cognitive
test scores were controlled for age (in days) at the time of
testing. We then used multiple linear regression to control
for the influences of the covariates, and tested the association
of the religiosity variables with the measures of cognitive
ability at each age. We included sex as a covariate since
reasonably consistent sex differences in religiosity have been
found in previous studies (with females tending to be more
religious; Francis & Penny, 2014). We also controlled for
education, since education has been found to correlate with
both religiosity and intelligence in previous studies (e.g. Lewis,
Ritchie, & Bates, 2011), and socioeconomic status, since
participants of different social classes may have had differ-
ences in their involvement in religious activities for
non-cognitive reasons.
Finally, to test associations between religious measures
and cognitive change within later life, we used latent growth
curve models, fit by full-information maximum likelihood
estimation, using the “OpenMx” package (Boker et al., 2011)
for R with Bates's (2013) additional “umx” functions. The
paths of interest in the model were those between the
covariate of religiosity (measured in the three ways
described above: religious involvement, religious wellbeing,
and attendance) and the latent intercept and slope of general
cognitive ability. To set the metric of each general intelli-
gence factor, one loading at each wave was fixed at 1. We
assumed factorial invariance, setting the intercepts of each
cognitive test, their loadings on their general factor, and the
residual factor variances to be the same across waves (the
findings of interest described below were not substantively
different if these constraints were not applied). The growth
curve models also included the covariates described above.
3. Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for each of the
religiosity variables and general cognitive ability at each
testing wave, and Table 2 shows their bivariate correlations
after correction for age. The religiosity variables were highly
correlated with one another (all above r = .6). TheTable 1
Descriptive statistics and sample sizes for each of the cognitive, religiosity, and contr
name.
Measure (max. score) n Age 79/83/87/90 Mean (SD) ag
Religious Involvement Inventory (132) –/360/–/– –
SWBS — Religious Wellbeing (60) –/338/–/– –
Religious attendance (4) 466/360/–/– 1.90 (1.19)
Moray House Test age 11 (76) 483 –
SES (5) 537/–/–/– 2.23 (.87)
Education 537/–/–/– 10.93 (2.47)
NART (50) 537/–/–/– 34.33 (8.16)
Raven's Matrices (60) 532/312/200/116 31.38 (8.65)
Verbal fluency 536/315/205/124 40.19 (12.25)
Logical memory (50) 539/288/205/126 31.94 (12.66)
General cognitive ability (g) 529/286/200/116 .14 (1.18)
Note: General cognitive ability (g) is a latent variable calculated from the scores oncorrelations between religious belief and intelligence mea-
sured at all four waves were negative; however, only the
correlation with intelligence at age 79 (4 years before the
religiosity questionnaires were completed; r = − .15 for
involvement and r = − .14 for wellbeing) was significant.
None of the measures of intelligence were correlated with
religious attendance. There was also no relation of the two
measures of pre-existing intelligence (age 11 MHT and
NART) to any of the religiosity variables; only later-life
intelligence was correlated with religious belief in our
sample. However, educational duration was significantly
positively related to age 83 religious attendance (r = .12;
but not age 79 attendance: r = .03), while socioeconomic
status was negatively related to religiouswellbeing (r = − .12).
3.1. Regression analyses
Table 3 shows the multiple linear regression results for
three models with each religiosity variable as the outcome
and intelligence at age 79 (to maximize the valid sample
size and therefore the power to detect a result) plus the
covariates as predictors. Only in the first analysis, with the RII
factor as the outcome, did intelligence have a significant
(negative) association. That is, the RII factor was related
to the general cognitive ability factor (β = − .14), but there
were no significant associations for religious wellbeing
or attendance (note that, for each analysis below, attendance
at age 79 was the variable used unless otherwise stated;
no substantial differences were found if this variable was
replaced with attendance at age 83). For intelligence
measured at ages 83 and 87, the RII factor had no significant
relationship to intelligence. Overall, then, the associations
that were significant in the correlation matrix remained so
after correction for sex, education, and SES, and this adjust-
ment did not cause any of the non-significant correlations
become significant.
We then tested our second hypothesis, regarding the
association between religiosity and cognitive change across
the life course (from age 11 to age 83). We first regressed age
83 general intelligence on age 11 Moray House Test score and
saved the residuals as an index of lifetime cognitive change.
We then used this index as the outcome in a regression
model including the control variables and all three religiosity
variables. The results of this model are shown in Table 4;
there were no significant effects of any of the religiosityol variables. Maximum scores are provided in parentheses after each variable
e 79 Mean (SD) age 83 Mean (SD) age 87 Mean (SD) age 90
73.94 (22.70) – –
36.48 (12.32) – –
1.84 (1.23) – –
46.63 (11.92) – –
– – –
– – –
– – –
29.85 (9.13) 27.89 (9.20) 26.39 (8.58)
39.91 (12.77) 40.04 (12.31) 39.59 (13.32)
32.80 (14.75) 33.02 (14.60) 33.27 (16.69)
− .02 (1.33) − .18 (1.33) − .29 (1.30)
Raven's Matrices, verbal fluency, and logical memory at each age.
Table 2
Correlation matrix for religiosity, cognitive, and control variables.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. Religious involvement –
2. Religious wellbeing .90 –
3. Religious attendance age 79 .64 .58 –
4. Religious attendance age 83 .70 .62 .84 –
5. MHT age 11 − .02 − .05 .00 .07 –
6. NART age 79 − .02 − .05 − .01 .07 .66 –
7. g age 79 − .15⁎⁎ − .14⁎ − .01 .01 .48 .53 –
8. g age 83 − .09 − .09 − .04 .00 .53 .51 .84 –
9. g age 87 − .07 − .08 .02 .03 .43 .44 .72 .86 –
10. g age 90 − .19 − .16 − .01 − .06 .50 .42 .63 .79 .76 –
11. Education − .03 − .06 .03 .12⁎ .43 .53 .37 .37 .36 .33 –
12. SES − .09 − .12⁎ .05 .07 .40 .49 .30 .29 .23⁎⁎ .26⁎⁎ .48 –
13. Sex .28 .23 .21 .16⁎⁎ .02 − .01 − .13⁎⁎ − .07 .04 .09 − .12⁎⁎ − .12⁎⁎
Note: Bold coefficients = p b .001. All cognitive tests corrected for age in days at testing. Religious involvement = Religious Involvement Inventory general
factor; religious wellbeing = Spiritual Wellbeing Scale–religious wellbeing score; MHT = Moray House Test; NART = National Adult Reading Test; g = general
cognitive ability, SES = socioeconomic status.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
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remained the case in three subsequent models with each of
the religiosity variables entered alone. Thus, we found no
significant effect of religiosity – of any sort – on cognitive
change from childhood to old age.
Our third hypothesis was tested by obtaining an index of
change in religious attendance and general cognitive ability
between ages 79 and 83 (again by regressing the later score
on the earlier score and saving the residuals) and using
attendance change to predict cognitive change in a regression
model controlling for the covariates (sex, SES, and educa-
tion). Paired t-tests showed that there was significant decline
in both age-corrected general cognitive ability (t(284) =
4.94, p b .001, d = .05) and religious attendance (t(344) =
3.12, p b .001, d = .08) between ages 79 and 83. The
regression results, shown in Table 5, showed no significant
effects of any of the variables; most importantly, change in
religious attendance was not associated with change in
general cognitive ability.Table 3
Multiple linear regression results for three regressions predicting each of the three
Outcome (valid n) Predictor
Religious involvement (339) Intercept
Sex — female
SES
Education
General intelligence
Religious wellbeing (336) Intercept
Sex — female
SES
Education
General intelligence
Attendance (455) Intercept
Sex — female
SES
Education
General intelligence
Note: All cognitive variables adjusted for age in days before inclusion in the ana
involvement = Religious Involvement Inventory general factor; religious wellbei
status.3.2. Latent growth curve analyses
Our final hypothesis, in line with several previous studies,
stated that higher religiosity would protect against cognitive
decline in old age. We entered the cognitive variables from
the four later-life waves into three latent growth curve
models (one for each of the religiosity variables), allowing
the religiosity variable and the covariates (sex, socioeconomic
status, and years of education) to have paths to the intercept
and slope of cognitive ability, as well as residual correlations
with one another. Themodel for the RII factor variable is shown
in Fig. 1, and the values for the longitudinal correlations
between subtests are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix A. All
three models fit well to the data (RII: χ2(5390) = 121.19, root
mean square error of approximation = .03, comparative fit
index = .99, Tucker–Lewis index = .98; religious wellbeing:
χ2(5386) = 120.92, RMSEA = .03, CFI = .99, TLI = .98; at-
tendance: χ2(5408) = 116.24, RMSEA = .02, CFI = .99, TLI =
.98).religiosity variables.
β SE t-Value p-Value
− .28 .08 −3.33 b .001
.53 .11 4.98 b .001
− .07 .06 −1.06 .29
.08 .06 1.28 .20
− .14 .06 −2.36 .02
− .22 .08 −2.61 .01
.43 .11 3.94 b .001
− .10 .06 −1.49 .14
.05 .06 .84 .40
− .12 .06 −1.86 .06
− .25 .07 −3.54 b .001
.44 .09 4.68 b .001
.07 .05 1.32 .19
.04 .05 .70 .49
− .02 .05 − .42 .67
lyses, and measured at age 79 (to maximize valid sample size). Religious
ng = Spiritual Wellbeing Scale–religious wellbeing; SES = socioeconomic
Table 4
Multiple linear regression results for a model (valid n = 226) predicting
lifetime cognitive change (between age 11 and age 83).
Predictor β SE t-Value p-Value
Intercept .09 .10 .96 .34
Sex — female .02 .13 .12 .90
SES .02 .08 .26 .79
Education .17 .07 2.32 .02
Religious involvement .03 .16 .18 .85
Religious wellbeing − .04 .15 − .27 .79
Religious attendance .07 .09 − .87 .39
Note: All cognitive variables adjusted for age in days before inclusion in the
analyses. Religious involvement and wellbeing measured at age 83; religious
attendance measured at age 79. Religious involvement = Religious
Involvement Inventory general factor; religious wellbeing = Spiritual
Wellbeing Scale–religious wellbeing; SES = socioeconomic status.
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was associated with the intercept of cognitive ability, it was
not associated with the slope. Therefore, religious involve-
ment was associated with average level of cognitive ability,
but was not protective against cognitive decline. Confidence
intervals around each of the theoretically-relevant paths in
the three models are shown in Table 6. For religious
wellbeing, a smaller, non-significant association with the
intercept of cognitive ability was found (coefficient = − .13,
95% CI [− .27, .004]), and there was a yet smaller link with
religious attendance (coefficient = − .04, [− .18, .09]). None
of the religiosity measures were significantly associated with
the slope of cognitive change. Overall, then, we could find
no evidence that religiosity affected cognitive decline within
old age. Similarly, none of the control variables had sig-
nificant relations to the slope of cognitive decline, but there
were substantial associations between educational duration
and SES and the intercept in each model (coefficients = .39
[.26, .51] and .19 [.08, .30] respectively in the model with
religious involvement; effects were similar in the remaining
two models).
4. Discussion
In a sample of adults tested in childhood and across
the ninth decade of life, we examined the associations of
religiosity – measured with two scales of religious belief and
an indicator of attendance at religious ceremonies – with
cognitive ability, cognitive change across the lifespan, and
cognitive change within later life. In our regression analyses,
we replicated the direction of the effect found in previous
studies: religiosity–intelligence associations were always
negative. However, in general, we found smaller relationshipsTable 5
Multiple linear regression results for a model (valid n = 247) predicting
cognitive change between ages 79 and 83.
Predictor β SE t-Value p-Value
Intercept − .07 .09 − .75 .46
Sex — female .17 .12 1.34 .18
SES − .03 .07 − .47 .64
Education .06 .07 .91 .36
Religious attendance change − .02 .06 − .39 .70
Note: All cognitive variables adjusted for age in days before inclusion in the
analyses. SES = socioeconomic status.than indicated by a meta-analysis of this topic (Zuckerman et
al., 2013). Whereas religiosity was significantly negatively
associated with intelligence measured 4 years earlier, the
association with a concurrent intelligence measure, while
negative, did not reach significance (this may have been due
to the lower valid sample size, and thus lower power, for this
correlation). There was no evidence of religiosity's association
with cognitive change either from age 11 to age 79, from age
79 to age 83, or from age 79 to age 90. We did not, therefore,
find evidence for the somewhat paradoxical phenomenon
described above, where religiosity is associated with lower
cognitive ability but religious attendance protects against
cognitive decline in older age.
Our estimates of the covariate-adjusted relation of general
intelligence to religious belief (β = − .14, p = .02 for the
general factor from the Religious Involvement Inventory, and
β = − .12, p = .06 for the religious wellbeing factor from the
Spiritual Wellbeing Scale) were on the lower end of the effect
sizes taken from the meta-analysis of religion and intelligence
by Zuckerman et al. (2013), which produced an overall effect
size of r = − .24. Indeed, the correlations between intelligence
tests and religiosity were generally small and non-significant
(Table 2), though the association between religious involve-
ment and the overall level of cognitive ability across all waves
in our growth curve model was significant; this may have been
due to the enhanced power afforded by the maximum-
likelihood modeling approach. In any case, the effect sizes
were modest; as was suggested above, these smaller effects
may be due to those individuals lower in religion at earlier
ages becoming more religious as they age, restricting the
range in religiosity and thus attenuating the correlation with
intelligence.
A similar explanation may underlie our finding of a small,
non-significant association between religious attendance and
intelligence (β= − .02, p = .67); due to its social aspects,
religious attendance may at later ages becomemore habitual for
a larger percentage of the population, causing it to lose its value
as an indicator of intelligence. Alternatively, these findings may
be cohort effects: for older cohorts, born at times of higher
societal religiosity (see Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 77, Fig. 3.4),
attendance at religious ceremonies may be a weaker signal of
cognitive ability. A longitudinal study testing both religiosity and
cognitive ability multiple times from midlife into old age would
be useful to test between these possibilities.
It should be noted that our results do not shed light on the
reason for the negative correlation of religious belief and
intelligence, now known to extend into late life. Future studies
should attempt to tease apart the potential reasons for the
correlation discussed by Zuckerman et al. (2013), some of
which are outlined above. It may be particularly interesting to
assess whether there are different explanations for the
correlation at different stages in the life course, and whether,
for instance, younger individuals with lower intelligence are
more likely to be religious due to conformism whereas older
low-intelligence individuals are more likely to be religious due
to religion's propensity to resolve uncertainty.
Consistent with the previous literature on religion and
cognitive decline, we found no effects of religious belief on
the slope of change in cognitive ability in old age. This was
despite our inclusion of two measures of religious belief that
were more comprehensive than in any study of this question
Fig. 1. Latent growth curve model of cognitive change, with religious involvement. Values are standardized path coefficients. Dotted lines indicate
non-significant paths (could be dropped without significant decrement in model fit). Residual longitudinal correlations between cognitive tests not shown for
reasons of space; see Table A1. Note: i = latent intercept; s = latent slope; g = general factor of cognitive ability; Rav = Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices;
VF = verbal fluency; LM = logical memory; Relig. Involve. = religious involvement (general factor); Educ. = years of education; SES = socioeconomic status.
For sex, 0 = male and 1 = female.
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found any evidence that individuals who hold stronger
religious beliefs will be protected against cognitive decline.
However, our study was not consistent with the finding of all
previous studies in this area (e.g. Corsentino et al., 2009; Hill
et al., 2006; Van Ness & Kasl, 2003), that attendance at
religious ceremonies was associated with healthier cogni-
tive aging. We found no effect of religious ceremony
attendance on cognitive change either across the lifespan,
or during later life. It should be noted that, to our knowledge,
this is the first study to test the religion–cognitive decline
association decline in a UK population. It is plausible that our
conflicting results are due to the generally lower levels of
importance placed on religion in the UK compared to, for
example, the US (see Norris & Inglehart, 2004, Ch. 4 for
international comparisons), where most previous studies
have been carried out (though see Yeager et al., 2006). This
highlights an important nuance for this area of study: in
samples from more secularized countries, such as those inWestern Europe, religiosity may have smaller health effects
than in countries where religion remains an important part
of life.
Although religious belief and attendance had either
negative or non-significant relations to the cognitive vari-
ables, religious attendance was significantly positively corre-
lated with educational duration (r = .12, Table 1). This is
perhaps surprising, since each of the cognitive variables
themselves had a moderate-to-strong positive correlation
with education. We would speculate that, in the UK, older
individuals with higher education may gravitate toward the
social aspects of religion, regardless of their intelligence. This
is partly supported by the positive (though admittedly
non-significant) correlation of SES with religious attendance;
conversely, SES was negatively related to the measures of
religious belief. Further studies of the correlates of the
various dimensions of religiosity in later life should be
performed to address these differential effects in the social
and cognitive domains.
Table 6
Standardized path coefficients and standard errors, with 95% confidence intervals, for the covariate relations to cognitive intercept and slope, for the three models
(“Religious involvement” model shown in Fig. 1). Statistically significant coefficients (p b .05) are in bold.
Model Path from Path to Coefficient SE 95% CI
Religious involvement Sex Intercept − .03 .05 [− .13, .07]
Sex Slope .13 .09 [− .05, .30]
Education Intercept .39 .06 [.28, .51]
Education Slope .02 .09 [− .16, .19]
SES Intercept .19 .06 [.08, .30]
SES Slope − .11 .10 [− .31, .09]
Religiosity Intercept − .17 .07 [− .30, − .03]
Religiosity Slope .01 .10 [− .20, .18]
Religious wellbeing Sex Intercept − .04 .05 [− .15, .06]
Sex Slope .12 .09 [− .05, .30]
Education Intercept .39 .06 [.27, .51]
Education Slope − .01 .09 [− .16, .19]
SES Intercept .19 .06 [.08, .31]
SES Slope − .11 .10 [− .31, .09]
Religiosity Intercept − .13 .07 [− .27, .004]
Religiosity Slope .02 .09 [− .16, .20]
Religious attendance Sex Intercept − .07 .05 [− .17, .04]
Sex Slope .15 .09 [− .02, .32]
Education Intercept .39 .07 [.27, .51]
Education Slope .02 .09 [− .15, .20]
SES Intercept .21 .06 [.09, .33]
SES Slope − .11 .10 [− .30, .09]
Religiosity Intercept − .04 .07 [− .18, .09]
Religiosity Slope − .09 .09 [− .27, .09]
Note: Religious involvement and wellbeing measured at age 83; religious attendance measured at age 79.
16 S.J. Ritchie et al. / Intelligence 46 (2014) 9–17As noted above, the strengths of this study were in our
detailed measures of religious belief and in the length,
frequency, detail, and age of follow-up testing. We were
able to examine the associations of religiosity with cognitive
decline across the ninth decade of life in a narrow-age cohort,
greatly reducing any problems of age heterogeneity that may
have influenced the results of previous studies. In addition,
we were not reliant on basic, pathology-focused tests of
cognitive function such as the MMSE, but estimated a general
factor of ability from multiple tests at each age.
The study has limitations. First, the sample size is modest.
Whereas we were adequately powered to reliably detect
religion–intelligence correlations of the size found in the
Zuckerman et al. (2013) meta-analysis, it is possible that we
were unable to detect smaller effects of religiosity on
cognitive decline in our growth curve analysis. The growth
curve would also have benefitted from a simultaneous model
of latent change in religious belief from age 79 to age 90,
allowing an estimation of the correlation of changes in
religiosity with those in cognition; longitudinal, latent
measurements of religiosity were not available in this
sample. Our analysis of change in religious attendance
between 79 and 83 was restricted by the attendance
measures both comprising one item; a range of items
would have allowed a more complex, latent-difference
score analysis (e.g. McArdle, 2009). This was also a limitation
for our analysis of lifetime cognitive change: no measures of
religiosity were available from earlier than age 79, and no
measures of religious belief from earlier than 83, meaning
that the religiosity measurements were taken after the
lifetime cognitive change had occurred. Since, as noted
above, religiosity changes throughout the lifespan, it is not
safe to assume that religiosity levels in older age reflect those
earlier in life. A study with multiple religiosity and cognitivemeasures taken across the lifespan would be able to provide
more accurate results on this question.
Further, our cohort had a restricted range of intelligence,
tending to have somewhat higher and less varied intelligence
scores than the general population (Deary, Whalley, Lemmon,
Crawford, & Starr, 2000). If religiosity is particularly protective
against cognitive decline in those toward the lower end of
the intelligence distribution, we may have missed its effects.
Finally, our religious belief measures were high quality, but our
measure of religious attendance was restricted to a single item.
More detailed measures, perhaps taking into account the depth
of and reasons for an individual's religious attendance, would
perhaps produce different results.5. Conclusion
The present study examined the associations between
religiosity, intelligence, and cognitive change across the lifes-
pan and in later life. It replicated the negative intelligence–
religiosity correlation found in previous studies (which almost
always included younger participants), though with smaller
effect sizes than have been found previously. Tentatively, we
suggest that this difference may reflect the higher average
religiosity level in older cohorts. However, the religiosity levels
in the cohort still had no effect on change in cognition across
the lifespan or within later life: we failed to replicate the
finding, discovered in all previous studies, that more frequent
attendance at religious ceremonies is associated with healthier
cognitive aging. We recommend that future studies of religios-
ity and later-life cognitive decline take into account the pos-
sibility that, in countries with less overall societal influence of
religion, spiritual and religious activity may exert a reduced
influence on cognitive aging.
17S.J. Ritchie et al. / Intelligence 46 (2014) 9–17Appendix ATable A1
Standardized path coefficients for residual longitudinal correlations between
cognitive tests (not shown in Fig. 1). These values were near-identical across
all growth curve models.
Variable 1 (age) Variable 2 (age) Coefficient SE
Rav (79) Rav (83) .34 .06
Rav (79) Rav (87) .32 .06
Rav (79) Rav (90) .26 .06
Rav (83) Rav (87) .31 .07
Rav (83) Rav (90) .23 .07
Rav (87) Rav (90) .18 .07
VF (79) VF (83) .60 .05
VF (79) VF (87) .59 .05
VF (79) VF (90) .57 .06
VF (83) VF (87) .61 .06
VF (83) VF (90) .58 .06
VF (87) VF (90) .57 .07
LM (79) LM (83) .49 .05
LM (79) LM (87) .39 .05
LM (79) LM (90) .33 .06
LM (83) LM (87) .48 .06
LM (83) LM (90) .38 .07
LM (87) LM (90) .45 .07
Note: Rav = Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices score; VF = verbal
fluency; LM = logical memory.References
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